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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

~

~

Case Number: 20150357-CA

BILLY ROHWEDDER
Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
Appeal from a conviction for theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree
felony, failing to stop at the command of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony,
and failure to signal, a class A misdemeanor in the Third District Court, State of Utah,
the Honorable, Elizabeth A. Hruby-Mills,Judge, presiding.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether the court erred in failing to fully address Mr. Rohwedder's motion to
dismiss the case for a speedy trial violation.
a. Standard of Review: ''We review the issue of whether a defendant was
deprived of his right to a speedy trial for correctness." State v. Hawki,ns, 2016
UT App 9,168, 366 P.3d 884 (citing State v. Younge, 2013 UT 71, 110, 321
P.3d 1127).
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1

b. Preservation of the Argument: Mr. Rohwedder moved to dis~ss for a
speedy trial violation on multiple occasions asserting his counsel continued
the case over his objections and asked the court to make proper findings.
See e.g., R. 77-78, 124, 131, 146-49, 151-52, 176-77, 324-26, 425; 534-37;
712:3-4, 343-46, 711:14, 710:6; 709:20; 707:4, 6-7; 706:6-13, 61.
2. Whether Mr. Rohwedder's right to self-representation was infringed by standby
counsel's failure to subpoena witnesses in Mr. Rohwedder's defense and failure to
provide him access to legal materials, such as the Utah Rules of Criminal
~

Procedure and relevant caselaw.
a. Standard of Review: "[A] trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no
particular deference; we review them for correctness." Kelson v. Salt Lake qy.,
784 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1989).
b. Preservation of the Argument: Mr. Rohwedder argues on multiple
occasions that he needed access to legal materials and that his counsel failed
to secure witness attendance. R. 443; 466-68; 492; 496; 706: 16-22, 25, 3435, 43, 46, 48-49, 59-60; 707:6-8; 709:6-10, 12, 14, 20-22; 710:11-12;
711 :7-8, 14.
3. Whether the court unfairly prejudiced Mr. Rohwedder by requiring him to wear
leg braces at trial.
a. Standard of Review: "The decision whether to restrain an accused rests in
the sound discretion of the trial judge and the test on review is whether the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

trial judge has abused that discretion." State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 4 73
(Utah Ct. App. 1991 ).
b. Preservation of the Argument: Mr. Rohwedder argued that shackling would
unfairly prejudice him. R. 498-99; 709:4-8, 22-23; 706: 14-15, 67-70; 705:7-

8.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The texts of the relevant Constitutional provisions and statutes are in Addendum
A and B.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Rohwcdder was charged on December 16, 2011. R. 1-6. The case was first
tried on September 4, 2013, when counsel moved for an inquiry into Mr. Rohwedder's
competency. R. 305. After Mr. Rohwcdder was found competent, the case was tried to
the jury on January 14 and 15, 2014. R. 279-80. Mr. Rohwedder timely appealed and
this court summarily reversed the conviction, given the court's failure to address Mr.
Rohwedder's claims of self-representation. R. 239-40; 314-16. On April 7 and 8, 2015,
the case was again tried to a jury, which convicted Mr. Rohwcdder, who largely
represented himself~ R. 704-05. Mr. Rohwedder appealed his conviction to this court. R.
617-18.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
To state the case simply, the State alleged that Mr. Rohwedder drove a stolen
vehicle. Its evidence consisted of a scent from a K9 dog that officers tracked to a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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neighborhood near Mr. Rohwedder, as well as officers' observations that Mr. Rohwedder
appeared to be sweating and breathing heavily when they arrived at his location. Mr.
Rohwedder's defense at trial was that he was walking from a friend's house to another
friend's house when officers came to the area and that he had no part in driving the stolen
vehicle.
For each of Mr. Rohwedder's issues, he will relate the relevant facts in that section.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I: Mr. Rohwedder moved to dismiss his case for a speedy trial violation

~

starting in August 2013. Because his case was not tried until nearly two years later, the
case needed to be dismissed assuming Mr. Rohwedder did not request continuances.
There were several defense-initiated continuances. However, Mr. Rohwedder asserted
that his counsel made these requests over his objection. The district court failed to
adequately inquire into the nature of these continuances (whether they were made over
Mr. Rohwedder's objection), especially given Mr. Rohwedder's strong assertion to the
right to self-representation and that his counsel did not represent his interests.
Point II: Mr. Rohwedder represented himself at trial. However, he repeatedly told
the court that his standby counsel failed to take actions to enable critical witnesses to
testify at trial. He identified at least three witnesses who could have provided an alibi and
his purpose for walking through the neighborhood where the crime was committed.
Standby counsel, however, violated Mr. Rohwedder's right to self-representation and was
ineffective in failing to take adequate measures to ensure the witnesses' attendance.
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Standby counsel also failed to provide Mr. Rohwedder access to legal materials, including
caselaw and statutes that would have enabled him to make proper arguments to the
court.
Point III: The district court required Mr. Rohwedder to wear shackles in front of
the jury, when it had a much less-restrictive alternative, which was an unseen taser vest.
The sight of shackles prejudiced Mr. Rohwedder with the jury. Mr. Rohwedder wanted
the freedom to move around the courtroom to conduct his defense and the court's
shackles requirement unconstitutionally abridged Mr. Rohwedder's right to a fair trial.
'4f

ARGUMENT

POINT I
The trial court failed to adequately assess Mr.
Rohwedder's speedy trial claim and failed to make
proper findings to enable appellate review.

For at least a year and a half, Mr. Rohwedder's case was delayed after he had
made a speedy trial demand. The district court should have granted Mr. Rohwedder's
motion to dismiss, and it also failed to adequately inquire into the nature of
representation to see if Mr. Rohwedder knowingly agreed to defense-requested
continuances. Mr. Rohwedder requests that this court reverse and allow the district court
to address the nature of defense-requested continuances to enable appellate review.
The State filed charges against Mr. Rohwedder on December 16, 2011. R. 1. Mr.
Rohwedder had counsel appointed within a few weeks, who demanded a preliminary
hearing, which was held on March 1, 2012. R. 9, 20-22. Mr. Rohwedder made his first
jury demand on August 27, 2012. R. 29-30. After that, there were multiple defense
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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requested continuances, which Mr. Rohwedder has asserted were made over his
objection. Defense counsel stipulated-to a continuance for the jury trial on December 19,
2012. R. 36. On January 7, 2013, the docket indicates that Mr. Rohwedder refused
transportation and the defense requested another continuance. R. 41. But onJanuary 28,
2013, Mr. Rohwedder appeared and for the second time requested a jury trial. R. 43. On
April 1, 2013, the court indicated that it had a conflict and had to reschedule the jury trial
date. R. 715:3. The defense requested two continuances, onJune 10, 2013 andJune 24,
2013 for Mr. Rohwedder to be evaluated for treatment. R. 47-48; 714:3. On July 1,
2013, Mr. Rohwedder failed to appear for court and onJuly 10, 2013, the court denied
his request to be released. R. 52-5 3.
On July 15, 2013, Mr. Rohwedder again asked for a continuance because of new
pending cases. R. 54. On July 21, 2013, Mr. Rohwedder wrote the court, asking it to
"consider an order having me thoroughly evaluated at the Utah State Mental Hospital.
Confinement in jails and prisons," he said, "is severely exacerbating my propensity for
psychological aberrations that could be counter-productive to future societal reintegration." R. 61. OnJuly 29, 2013, the court, on a defense motion, set the case for jury
trial in September. R. 64-65. In the interim, Mr. Rohwedder wrote the court a letter
asking to remove his current attorney, which appears to have gone unaddressed by the
court. R. 66-6 7.
After these few years of continuances, starting in the fall of 2013 Mr. Rohwedder
began to clearly assert his speedy trial demands. On August 16, 2013, Mr. Rohwedder
wrote a pro se pleading to the court in which he asserted that "the prosecution and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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L.D .A. 's office are illegally (unconstitionally) cooperating and consorting to deprive
petitioner (a citizen) of 'life, liberty, property, and happiness in unnecessary delays,
reneges on pleas (deceptions) ... " R. 77. He asked the court to dismiss the case for the
delays, adding that the prosecution had a duty to resolve the cac;e expeditiously. R. 78.
Mr. Rohwedder reiterated that request in a motion filed August 22, 2013. R. 80. At a
hearing held August 26, 2013, the court denied Mr. Rohwedder's requests. R. 87. On
August 30, 2013, Mr. Rohwedder again wrote the court, complaining of conditions in the
jail, and added that "[i]f the L.D.A., the prosecutor, and judicial administration would of
properly done their jobs and had these cases done and over with a year ago I would of
been sleeping in bed ... " R. 124.
On that September 4, 2013 jury trial date, the parties began jury selection. R. 305.
At that hearing, counsel for Mr. Rohwedder believed a continuance was appropriate
because of some late-received police reports. R. 305:4-5. Mr. Rohwedder, however,
would not agree to his counsel's request for a continuance. "He's invoked his speedy trial
rights," counsel told the court. R. 305:5, 6. Mr. Rohwedder complained that the case had
taken so long and the court inquired if it was his desire to move forward. R. 305:6-7.
Having had those assurances, the court allowed the case to progress. Id. However, during
jury selection, defense counsel moved to continue the trial date because she believed Mr.
Rohwedder had "a mental illness of paranoid schizophrenic" and that he was acting
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"paranoid" during the selection process. R. 305:48. The court continued the trial date to
assess Mr. Rohwedder's competency. R. 305:50. 1
On September 12, 2013, Mr. Rohwedder told the court that during the trial, he
was bothered by his attorney's particular questioning of jurors (which was the basis for
questioning his competency) but reiterated that the many months of delay had been
"violative of my 14th Amendment." R. 129-31. "I'm politely requesting expedient
conclusions to all of these cases," he asserted, adding that if counsel could not protect his
speedy trial rights, then "I need to appear before my 90 day schedule of 'speedy trial' is
up· in about 2 weeks and will appear pro se." R. 131.
A month later, on October 17, 2013, while the competency proceeding was
pending, Mr. Rohwedder filed another pro se motion for immediate dismissal due in part

~

to "unnecessary delays." R. 146. The same day, he also asked to dismiss counsel and to
represent himself. R. 149.
In a prose filing titled "Habeas Corpus" filed November 4, 2013, Mr. Rohwedder
again asked for dismissal of the case. R. 151-52. He complained that his lawyer "has
intentionally requested a series of unnecessary delays" and that the court had ignored his
requests to go prose and his· requests to dismiss the case. R. 151-52.
Despite Mr. Rohwedder having made multiple requests for expediency, his
Cw

counsel asked for, and the court granted, a request to continue the case, and then at a
hearing on December 2, 2013, Mr. Rohwedder again asked to represent himself. R. 176Both alienists found Mr. Rohwedder competent to stand trial, but indicated that he was
"likely to have interpersonal wrangles with anyone attempting to defend him." R. 160175.
1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
8
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

77. New counsel appeared December 5, 2013 and on December 9, 2013, Mr.
Rohwedder again asked to represent himself, which the court chose not to address at that
time. R. 178-79.
The case was tried about a month later, onjanuary 14 and 15, 2014. R. 279-80.
At that trial, Mr. Rohwedder was represented by counsel and the jury convicted him. Id.;
R. 235. Mr. Rohwedder waived time and the court sentenced him to prison. R. 194; 23638. He appealed his conviction to this court. R. 239-40.
On September 30, 2014, Mr. Rohwedder filed a pro se pleading in the district
court where he again asserted his speedy trial rights. R. 306-10. On October 7, 2014, this
court summarily reversed and vacated the conviction, finding that the trial court did not
address his requests to represent himsel£ R. 314-15.
On December 3, 2014, Mr. Rohwcdder asserted his speedy trial rights again,
claiming that both trial and appellate counsel and the court unreasonably delayed the
case and at a hearing held December 22, 2014, he reasserted those same rights. R. 32426; 712:3-4. On December 31, 2014, he again claimed that his case had been
unjustifiably delayed by those parties and asked the court to dismiss the case. R. 343-46.
At a hearing heldjanuary 12, 2015, Mr. Rohwedder told the district court that he
wanted to represent himself, but that he needed access to a comprehensive law library,
and that if the court would not order that access, then he would need co-counsel. R.
711 :7-8. Ile reminded the court that he had a.'ist'.rl.t'.cl his righL Lo a :spee<ly Lrial and LhaL
the court had "drastically overlooked" that argument. R. 711: 14.
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On February 20, 2015, the court denied Mr. Rohwedder's motion, reasoning that
"defendant's own conduct and requests for continuances on behalf of the defendant
explain the substantial portion of the delays experienced. The court's and counsels'
calendar issues as well as State witness issues also resulted in not unreasonable delays.
Trial on remand has been set expeditiously." R. 401.
At a hearing set February 23, 2015, Mr. Rohwedder objected to the court's ruling.
He stated, in part, "in Barker v. JiVingo it says the Court should assess such factors as the
length of and reason for delay, the defendant's assertion of the right and prejudice to the
defendant." R. 710:6. Apparently, Mr. Rohwedder had not received the court's ruling or
reply and the court allowed him time to file a response. R. 710:6-8.
In a reply memorandum filed March 3, 2015, Mr. Rohwedder argued that his jury
demand was made on August 2 7, 2012 and that he never actually refused transportation.
R. 405; 495 (reiterated this claim). He claimed that on that August date he told the court
as well as substitute counsel Cara Tangaro that "he wanted a speedy trial" and that his
attorney at the time "was intentionally delaying without I in direct opposition to
petitioner's speedy trial demand." R. 407-08. He stated that after 18 months, his counsel
still was not prepared for trial and inappropriately requested a competency hearing. R.
409-10. He attributed one-day missing court to a miscommunication between himself and
counsel. R. 411.
On March 5, 2015, Mr. Rohwedder told the court that he never refused
transportation and that the State's claims about that were "unsubstantiated." R. 709: 16.
The court responded that "we're not really here to discuss that too much." R. 709: 17. He
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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reiterated that he was "prepared to do whatever it takes ... I want to get a speedy trial,"
and that he thought it was critical that he have some evidence and witnesses produced,
"I'm not waiving my speedy trial right," although he acknowledged he may ask for a few
more weeks to secure this evidence. R. 709:20. Mr. Rohwedder reaffirmed that he
planned to conduct the trial on his own without the assistance of standby counsel. R.
~

709: 13. He also reasserted his speedy trial issues in a motion for release mailed that same
date. R. 425.
Mr. Rohwedder was not transported for a hearing which was held March 9, 2015.
R. 708:3. His standby counsel oddly said (given at least two years of speedy trial demands)
that Mr. Rohwedder was "inclined to request a continuance" to locate some officers and
evidence and that he'd "be waiving any speedy trial rights." R. 708:4. Counsel said he
was only the "messenger" and that the two of them specifically discussed that request. R.
708:4-5. The State indicated its concern that Mr. Rohwedder himself was waiving speedy

01

trial rights. R. 708:4. But after counsel's reassurance, the court reset the jury trial date
about a month later for April 7 and 8, 2015. R. 363-64; 708:5.
On March 16, 2015, the State moved for a continuance to obtain officer testimony
and the court denied that request. R. 455-56; 520; 707:9. On March 18, 2015, Mr.
Rohwedder asserted that he never refused transportation, including the previous hearing.
R. 495-96.
On March 23, 2015, Mr. Rohwedder again moved the court to dismiss the case
for a speedy trial violation. R. 534-37. At a hearing held March 30, 2015, Mr.
Rohwedder reminded the court of his motion for speedy trial and stated that " [n] ow I
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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understand that there's another continuance which should actually be unnecessary"
because the appellate court had sent the case down back in November of 2014. R. 707:4,
6-7.
The court heard the speedy trial claim at a hearing on April 6, 2015 where Mr.
Rohwedder reminded the court that he did not refuse to attend hearings, telling it that he
sent a GRAMA request for the jail documentation to prove that he did not refuse to
attend hearings. R. 706:6-7. He moved the court to dismiss for a speedy trial violation. R.
706: 7. The court indicated that it would not reconsider adding that "all the rulings that I
previously made stand ... " R. 706: 10. Mr. Rohwedder added that his claim involved the
ineffective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel-that had they properly pursued
his request for disposition, that the case would have been dismissed. R. 706:12-13. The
court again added that it would not reconsider the issue. R. 706:13. Mr. Rohwedder
asserted his speedy trial issues again at the end of the hearing, saying that after three and
~

a half years, "a case will almost inevitably be prejudiced." R. 706:61.

A.

STANDARDS GOVERNING SPEEDY TRIAL CLAIMS

"The Sixth Amendment guarantees that '[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial."' State v. Younge, 2013 UT 71,
ifl6, 321 P.3d 1127. "The 'right to a speedy trial is "fundamental" and is imposed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the States."' Id. (quoting Barker v.

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,515, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2184, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972)). "[I]he speedy
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trial right reserved under the Utah Constitution is no greater or lesser than its federal
counterpart." State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1328 n.3 (Utah 1986).
According to the Utah Supreme Court the "appropriate analysis for a speedy trial
claim . . . involves a four-factor 'balancing test, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed."' Id. ,I 17. The factors are: "length of delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant." Id. "No specific factor is 'either a necessary or sufficient condition to the
finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial' because 'they are related factors and
must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant."' Id. "But,
because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be
carried out with full recognition that the accused's interest in a speedy trial is specifically
affirmed in the Constitution." Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.

1. Length of delay
"The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism." Id. ,I 18. "[A]
delay approaching one year is presumptively prejudicial." Id. If a defendant's rights are
violated, it "leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment." Id.,

,I 16 (quoting Barker); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 61·7, 652 n. l (1992).
In this case, the delay from indictment to the first trial was 760 days, over two
years. From the indictment to the second trial was 1208 days, over three years. Even from
this court's reversal to the retrial, where Mr. Rohwedder repeatedly a':isert.ed his speedy

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
13 may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

trial rights, was 182 days, or half a year. Thus, the length of day was presumptively
prejudicial since it took more than three years to try Mr. Rohwedder.
2. Reason for the Delay

The following chart depicts the delays in the case and who requested them. There
are two significant points: Mr. Rohwedder himself only requested 14 days of delay in his
case. The State also did not necessarily ask for continuances (it asked once and was
denied). As the Court stated in Barker, "a defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial;
the State has that duty .... " 407 U.S. at 527. Indeed, "the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant." Barker, 407
U.S. at 531.
The vast majority of the requests to continue were made by Mr. Rohwedder's
counsel and arguably could be attributed to him. However, Mr. Rohwedder repeatedly
told the court that the problem was not that he wanted to delay the case, but that his

counsel continued to insist on continuances over his objections. See e.g., R. 77. The court
failed to inquire into the reasons for the continuances, and as such, this court needs to
remand for a hearing on this issue.
Hearing Date_
..

:

:'

...

!

Defendant's .
Request

..

i .

.

"'

Defense.·'
Counsel's
Request···_

Court
Cause
'

.

State's
Request
..

~

December 16, 2011
August 27, 2012
Jury trial request
December 19, 2012

114

January 7, 2013 (claim that

19
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Q,

Mr. Rohwedder refused
transport)
January 28, 2013 Gury
request)
April 1, 20 13 (court set jury
trial)
June 10, 2013

70

June 24, 2013

14

July 1, 2013 (failure lo
appear)
July 15, 2013 (Mr.
Rohwedder's pending
cases)
July 21, 2013
(psychological needs)
August 16, 2013
July 29, 2013
(case set for trial)
September 4, 2013
(counsel's assertion of
incompetency)
December 2, 2013
(requests to dismiss and
represent self)
January 14, 2014 Gury trial)
~

21

63

7
14

7
Assertion of right to speedy trial and claims that counsel was
not representing his interests.
8
37

89

43

October 7, 2014 (reversed
on appeal)
December 3, 2014
(reassertion of speedy trial
claim)
March 9, 2015 (not
transported)
April 7, 2015 Gury trial)

TOTAL

266

96
29
14

551·

329

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
1.1
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0

As the Court opined in Barker, "[w]hether and how a defendant asserts his right is

closely related to the other factors we have mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be
affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most
particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he
experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to
complain. The defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right."

Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
There is no question that Mr. Rohwedder repeatedly asserted his right to speedy
trial and complained on numerous occasions to the court that his counsel made many of
the requested continuances over his objection. See e.g., R. 407-10. Mr. Rohwedder told
the court that these continuances affected his ability to procure witnesses in his defense.
R. 706: 16; 709:20-21. Yet the record does not demonstrate, and the court failed to make
findings on or inquire into whether defense counsel did, in fact, make the requested
continuances over Mr. Rohwedder's objection. Thus, this court must remand the matter
to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on whether Mr. Rohwedder agreed to the
continuances.
B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Mr. Rohwedder was harmed by his counsel's delays on the case. "Unreasonable
delay between formal accusation and trial threatens to produce more than one sort of
harm, including 'oppressive pretrial incarceration,' 'anxiety and concern of the accused,'
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and 'the possibility that the accused's defense will be impaired' by dimming memories
l.~
\/Ji/

and loss of exculpatory evidence. Doggett, 505 U.S. 647, 654.
As the Supreme Court has said, "'of these forms of prejudice, 'the most serious is

the last, because the inability of the defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system."' Dogget, 505 U.S. at 654 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
(,:JP

Moreover, Mr. Rohwedder does not have to be able to specifically demonstrate how his
defense has been impaired, in order to prove prejudice. "Impairment of one's defense is
the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time's erosion of
exculpatory evidence and testimony 'can rarely be shown."' Id. at 655 (quoting Barker, 407
U.S. at 532). Rather, excessive delay presumptively prejudices the reliability of a trial in
ways that cannot be proven or even identified. Id. This presumption of prejudice is to be
considered in conjunction with the other Barker factors, but its importance increases with
the length of the delay. Id. at 656.
But in this case, Mr. Rohwedder asserted that he was harmed by the delay,
specifically because he had difficulty procuring the attendance of nine witnesses, including
the State's main witness who had testified in the preliminary hearing. See e.g., R. 706: 1213; 16; 61; 709:20-21.

In sum, a consideration of all four of the Barker factors - (1) the length of the delay;
(2) the reason for the delay; (3) the def~ndant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to
the defendant- strongly supports a finding that Mr. Rohwedder's constitutional right to a
speedy trial has been violated.
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The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that, despite being a severe
remedy, dismissal of a case when the speedy trial right has been violated is the "on!:J

possible remedy." Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 (emphasis added). The Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide that the court shall dismiss an action when "there is unreasonable or
unconstitutional delay in bringing a defendant to trial." Utah R. Crim. Pro. 25(b)(l).
Furthermore, "[a]n order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the
defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any other
prosecution for the offense charged." Utah R. Crim Pro. 25(d). These rules· have also
been codified in statue and the Utah Code likewise states that "[a]n order of dismissal
based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to trial or upon the statute of
limitations is a bar to any other prosecution for the offense charged." Utah Code Ann. §
77-l-7(l)(a) and (2) (2008).
This court has noted that: "Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(d) provides that,
'[a]n order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to
trial ... shall be a bar to any other prosecution for the offense charged.' Unconstitutional
delay occurs when a defendant's fundamental right to a speedy trial has been violated.

State v. Cornejo, 138 P.3d 97 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
In this case, the record clearly shows that Mr. Rohwedder requested dismissal on
numerous occasions for the delay. He also alleged that his counsel made the continuance
requests over his objections. Mr. Rohwedder argued in his Rule 23B motion for remand
that the record needed to be developed as to why defense counsel made these
continuance requests over Mr. Rowhedder's objection. But even without that remand,
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the record shows that Mr. Rohwedder, from August 16, 2013, consistently and repeatedly
asserted that his right to speedy trial had been violated. Given that the case was tried
almost two years later, Mr. Rohwedder was clearly prejudiced. And, as detailed in point
~

II, the multiple delays prevented Mr. Rohwedder from obtaining favorable witness
testimony. For these reasons, this court needs to remand the matter to the district court to
fully assess whether Mr. Rohwedder himself agreed to the continuances.

POINT II
Mr. Rohwedder's right to self-representation was
violated by his standby counsel's failure to provide
hun. access to legal materials prior to trial and to
help him secure the presence of witnesses essential
to his defense.

Mr. Rohwedder repeatedly told the court that his standby counsel failed to do two
things: I) provide him access to relevant legal materials, including statutes, rules and
caselaw and 2) subpoena witnesses essential to his defense. This amounted both lo an
~

abridgement of his right to self-representation and to ineffective assistance of standby
counsel.
At a hearing held January 12, 2015, Mr. Rohwedder told the district court that he
wanted to represent himself, but that he needed access to a comprehensive law library,
and that if the court would not order tl1at access, then he would need co-counsel. R.
711 :7-8. He reminded the court that he had asserted his right to a speedy tria1 and that
the court had "ch astically overlooked" that argument. R. 71 l: 14.
4

On February 23, 2015, Mr. Rohwedder claimed that standby counsel was not
representing his interests. "This guy right here, he's not on my team. I'm representing
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myself. The only thing I'm using him for is a law library. He's just a mouthpiece .... I
don't feel like I'm being properly represented. I feel like there's a lot of issues going on."
R. 710:11. He stated that counsel was not helping him mount his defense. R. 710:11-12.
On March 5, 2015, Mr. Rohwedder told the court his concerns about his standby
counsel providing him information and evidence. R. 709:6. Counsel responded with the
question: "I suppose my concern is, you know, and maybe,Judge, you can appreciate my
position-is am I counsel? Am I not counsel? You know? And so I know that you've
wanted us to act as your law library and I'm happy to do that ... " R. 709:8. Mr.
Rohwedder argued that he had two witnesses he wanted to appear and complained that
without a proper library, it was difficult for him to file motions. R. 709:9, 10. Counsel
responded that he was happy to assist Mr. Rohwedder with legal research and with
subpoenas. R. 709:12. Mr. Rohwedder emphasized that he needed "two witnesses"
subpoenaed and evidence produced. R. 709:14. He again argued that though he would
not waive his speedy trial rights, that he would agree to a continuance of a few days in
order to secure the presence of his witnesses and the physical evidence. R. 709:20-21.
Standby counsel promised that they would attempt to secure the witnesses' presence at

~

court. R. 709:21-22.
On March 10, 2015, Mr. Rohwedder mailed a motion asking the court to give
him a copy of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as relevant caselaw. R. 466-

68. He claimed his appointed counsel gave him irrelevant and unhelpful information. R.
468. Again, on March 17, 2015, he claimed his co-counsel ineffectively helped "in
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procuring proper Rules and case law" to support Mr. Rohwedder's claims. R. 492. He
reiterated his request for access to a law library and to relevant caselaw. R. 492.
On March 15, 2015, Mr. Rohwedder moved the court to produce evidence, in
particular, a person named Colby, who he said was the person he was going to meet the
evening the police arrested him. R. 443. He said this person was in the jail in section B-2
~

and was released the same day Mr. Rohwedder was transferred from section B-3. R. 443.
On March 18, 2015, Mr. Rohwedder again argued that his attorney had failed to
procure witnesses and evidence that he needed. R. 496. At a March 30, 2015 hearing,
Mr. Rohwedder asserted that he gave his standby counsel a map to a witnesses' home. R.
707:6-7, 8. He wondered why there were so many delays when he was ')ust asking for
two witnesses in my case and one of them is a police officer." R. 707:8.
About three weeks later and a day before trial, Mr. Rohwedder argued that his
counsel still failed to procure his witnesses. R. 706: 16. "[I]hey don't want to locate my
witnesses," he said. R. 706:16. Standby counsel claimed that the "cannot find the
individual known as Colby" and that although they were "given a map to locate another
witness," they would start to locate that witness "this evening." R. 706: 16. Counsel said
he did not know Colby's last name and the map was a few years old. R. 706:16. Mr.
Rohwedder responded that he had given this information to both his original and conflict
attorney, that they had had several years to follow up on this information and that when
his family had last checked, the contact information was correct. R. 706: 17-18.

Mr. Rohwedder complained that his standby counsel still had failed to provide
him the rules or relevant cases. R. 706:19-20. The State claimed Mr. Rohwedder could
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get a paralegal at the prison, but Mr. Rohwedder disputed that, saying that_ they will only
~

provide assistance in 1983 actions." R. 706:20-21. Counsel responded that he was
available as a "resource" to Mr. Rohwedder. R. 706:21. Second counsel stated that they
provided Mr. Rohwedder with "two short summaries on the Utah Rules of Evidence." R.
706:21. The court denied Mr. Rohwedder's motion, noting that stand by counsel would
assist him. R. 706:21. Mr. Rohwedder disputed that fact, stating that "I can't receive the
necessary information that I need in order to properly represent myself." R. 706:22.
Without those materials, he said he was "being forced to represent myself ineffectively."

R. 706:22.
He said no one was "providing me with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the Utah Rules of Evidence and all the other necessary information" to represent himself;
and he was bothered that he would be expected to follow the rules without being given
them. R. 706:25; 706:46 ("I've repeatedly asked for months now to acquire those same
rules and procedures as any lawyer, but I haven't received them. So I can't be expected to
follow something that I don't know what it is"); 706:48 ("There's no way that I can be
expected to follow the same rules and procedures as any lawyer if those same rules and
procedures have been denied to me"). "[NJ ow that I can't research the information on
my own and I don't have electronic access to case law," he complained. R. 706:25; see
also 706:42-43 ("I got a problem with the fact that I asked for the same rules and the
procedures that are provided to, including electronic access to case law that the
prosecution gets. The Judge said no. So I feel like I'm getting ineffective assistance of
counsel because I'm not even getting--I'm severely handicapped from the information
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that I'm not being provided with"). Later, he reiterated that without access to the Rules of
Evidence and Criminal Procedure, he lacked the ability to argue his claims. R. 706:34;
706:43 ("I don't feel like I've been provided with an equal substitute"). The State offered
to bring a copy of the code and Rules of Evidence. R. 706:49. At trial, his standby
counsel provided a laptop with access to the Rules of Evidence and Rules of Criminal
Procedure. R. 705:6.
He again objected that his counsel failed to locate "a key witness" in his case. R.
706:35. He said he filed a GRAMMA request to get the witness's location at the jailwhich was in B-2 at the same time Mr. Rohwedder was there. R. 706:59. He also
provided them a map to his home. R. 706:59-60. Standby counsel had the map in court.

R. 706:60.
According to the record, Mr. Rohwedder repeatedly asserted that he needed
access to caselaw and to witness contact information. Counsel told the court that they had
a witness map, names and other information, and acknowledged Mr. Rohwedder had
given them that information.
Mr. Rohwedder had limited ability to subpoena witnesses or locate them when he
was in custody and had to rely on standby counsel's efforts, even though he was
representing himsel£ "[A] choice between proceeding with incompetent counsel or no
counsel is in essence no choice at all." Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32, 36 (7th Cir. 1980).
Requiring a defendant to choose between self-representation and some other course of
action does not always enable a defendant to make a totally voluntary decision. "If a
choice presented to a petitioner is constitutionally offensive, then the choice cannot be
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voluntary." State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 1 20, 979 P.2d 799. When proceeding pro se, a
defendant has a "limited ability to locate and contact witnesses." Id. at

1 68.

Mr.

Rohwedder had to depend on his standby counsel because he was in custody.
To be effective, counsel must "'adequately investigate the underlying facts' of the
case because investigation sets the foundation for counsel's strategic decisions about how
to build the best defense." State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14,

,r

69, 152 P.3d 321 (citations

omitted).
[SJ trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic
choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely
to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations
on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984); see State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 356 (Utah 1996) (holding "'decision not to
investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision"' (citation omitted)); State v. Huggins,
920 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding "'counsel has a duty to make
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary"' (emphasis and citations omitted)); State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d
1085, 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("'[f]he Sixth Amendment imposes on counsel a duty
to investigate, because reasonably effective assistance must be based on professional
decisions[,] and informed legal choices can be made only after investigation of options.' "
(citation omitted)).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
24
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Standby counsel has some duties in these cases if the pro se defendant cannot
accomplish them himself. An attorney "should always aid in facilitating the judicial
process," especially here where Mr. Rohwcdder lacked the means to contact or subpoena
witnesses or review statutes and ca'ies. State v. Stokes, 243 N.W.2d 372, 375 (N.D. 1976);
Tidwell v. Hicks, 791 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 2015) (court provided defendant with

subpoena forms and directed standby counsel to assist him); Com. v. Grace, No. 1501 WDA
2012, 2013 WL 11253848, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 2013) ("standby counsel would
assist [the defendant] in subpoenaing witnesses, a task that [he] could not perform from
prison"); State v. DuBois, 189 NJ. 454, 474, 916 A.2d 450, 462 (2007) (standby counsel
assisted defendant both in pretrial and during trial in obtaining witness testimony); People
v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 33-34, 670 N.E.2d 583, 599 (1996) (court "explained to defendant

that although defendant was representing himself, he could use standby counsel to locate
and subpoena witnesses").
Numerous courts have held that standby counsel must at least competently
perform the tasks the defendant cannot accomplish himsel£ See, e.g., Jelinek v. Costello, 24 7
F.Supp.2d 212, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[W]here standby or advisory counsel assumes an
advisory role or exercises a degree of control over a defendant's case, 'his or her potential
~

for ineffectiveness, though diminished by the defendant's primary role, is not completely
eliminated."') (Citation omitted.); State v. McDonald, 143 Wash.2d 506, 22 P.3d 791, 79495 (Wash. 2001) ("Generally, defendants who are afforded the right to self-representation
cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel for the obvious reason they become their
own counsel and assume complete responsibility for their own representation. However,
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this does not mean standby counsel has no obligations or duties to the defendant when
standby counsel has been appointed by the court. A defendant possesses a right to have
conflict-free standby counsel because standby counsel must be (1) candid and forthcoming
in providing technical information/ advice, (2) able to fully represent the accused on a
moment's notice, in the event termination of the defendant's self-representation is
necessary, and (3) able to maintain attorney-client privilege.") (also finding that trial court
has a duty to inquire into conflicts between the defendant and standby counsel); Armor v.

La.ntz, 207 W.Va. 672, 535 S.E.2d 737, 748 ~.Va. 2000) ("To prevail on a claim that
counsel acting in an advisory or other limited capacity has rendered ineffective assistance,
a self-represented defendant must show that counsel failed to perform competently within

the limited scope of the duties assigned to or assumed by counsel.") (Quotation marks omitted.)
(Citations omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)).
Mr. Rohwedder did not entirely self-represent. His standby counsel was involved
in voir-dire and selection of jurors. See e.g., R. 705:50-62, 70-75 (i.e., standby counsel:
"We wouldn't have any objection to any follow-up questions with 3."). He also invoked
the exclusionary rule, objected to statements, withdrew objections, and discussed matters
with the prosecutor. R. 704:62, 128, 140-41; 705:13; 50-51, 100, 131. After the verdict,
Mr. Rohwedder asked standby counsel to act as counsel. R. 704: 143-44. Thus, this is not
a case where standby counsel merely gave advice or assisted Mr. Rohwedder. Indeed,
Mr. Rohwedder referred to them as his "co-counsel" during the trial. R. 705:56, 61, 155,
156. From Mr. Rohwedder's perspective, he largely wanted to represent himself with
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assistance from standby counsel. Because counsel took a more active role, they had duties
to ensure Mr. Rohwedder was able to accomplish the tasks he needed.
In one Washington case, for example,. the State provided the following services to
a pro se defendant:
1) Access to legal materials;
2) Pencil and paper;
3) Copying services.;
4) Tnmate.s' tde.phone;
5) SherifPs office to serve subpoenas;
6) Coordination services through standby counsel (arranging interviews,
confirming motions);
7) Blank subpoena forms from standby counsel;
8) Postage;
9) Access to a notary; and
10) Witness interviews.

State v. Silva, 107 Wash. App. 605, 625, 27 P.3d 663, 676 (2001). The court observed that
"these state-provided resources constituted the reasonable tools necessary for [the
defendant] to prepare a meaningful pro se defense" under the constitution. Id.
However, Mr. Rohwedder had virtually none of these materials. He asked for
access to legal materials, and while he eventually had access to the code at trial, he was
never given access to caselaw, which he insisted he needed on multiple occasions pretrial.

Mr. Rohwedder was prejudiced for several reasons:
First, he was unable to procure the attendance of witnesses in his defense. One
person was an inmate named Colby whom he said was the person he was walking to meet
that evening. R. 443, 706:16-18, 35, 59-60; 707:6-8. He provided his counsel with the cell
~

Colby was staying in (section B-2), as well as a map to his cousin's home. Id.; 706:58-59.
This person was a key witness, since police alleged that Mr. Rohwedder drove the vehicle
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and fled into the neighborhood. If Mr. Rohwedder was actually walking to see Colby,
i)

and Colby (or his cousin Amanda) could testify to this fact, then Mr. Rohwedder would
have a reasonable explanation for his presence in the area. Mr. Rohwedder also wanted
to subpoena Colby's cousin named Amanda, whose home Colby shared. R. 704: 122;
706: 16-1 7. He also wanted to subpoeana April Rodriguez, who was the person whose
house he was at at the Broadmoor Townhome. R. 704: 122; 706:33. These witnesses
could have established Mr. Rohwedder's alibi-that he had no connection to the car and
was merely walking from one place to another. Standby counsel's failures to procure these
witnesses prejudiced Mr. Rohwedder from putting on a complete defense. Nor could he
rely on the court to remedy the problem, since when he raised it the court indicated that
"[t]he Court doesn't subpoena witnesses for you." R. 709: 12.
Second, Mr. Rohwedder's late access to legal materials prevented him from
meaningfully raising issues, such as the points in this brief, because he was unable to
provide the court with precise legal authorities to support his claims.
Courts should, at a minimum, allow a defendant "adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828,
97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498 (1977). Mr. Rohwedder has a right to "meaningful access to the
courts, which can be met by adequate law libraries for a pro se defendant, but also by
other alternative means, including proffering assistance from available counsel." Garth v.

State, 411 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); see also Best v. State, 566 N.E.2d 1027,
1030 (Ind. 1991) ("A pro se defendant's right of access to court is not undermined when
he is denied direct access to a law library if he has access to legal materials and legal
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assistance through his standby counsel"). "Pro se defendants have a right of access to
adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." United

Stales v. Knox, 950 .F.2d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted).
But what occurred here is that Mr. Rohwedder's standby counsel failed to provide
him access to the legal materials he requested pretrial. Without those materials, Mr.
Rohwedder could not fully and competently present his case at trial. He repeatedly,
throughout the trial, questioned whether he was allowed to make specific objections, or
had objections sustained against him. See e.g., R. 704:29, 33, 44, 47, 50, 53, 114, 115, 117,
119,121, 122-23, 131,132,133,134; 705:65-67, 72-73, 149-50, 178-80, 190-92, 198-99,
215. Had Mr. Rohwedder had access to materials, he could have looked more prepared
in front of the jury and could have avoided improper questioning or argument.
For these reasons, this court should find that Mr. Rohwedder's right to selfrepresentation was violated by his standby counsel's failure to procure witnesses in his
defense and provide him access to legal materials.

POINT III
The trial court inappropriately required Mr.
Rohwedder, who was representing him.self prose, to
wear leg shackles when it had a less-restrictive and
non-prejudicial alternative

On March 5, 2015 at a pre-trial conference, the parties brought up the issue of
how Mr. Rohwedder was going to be clothed. R. 709:4. The court wondered how well
Mr. Rohwedder could move with them on and considered requiring all the parties to sit
at the table. R. 709:5. Standby counsel indicated that that solution was "fine with us." R.
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709:5. But minutes later, standby counsel asked whether he even was counsel on the case.
R. 709:8. The bailiff told the court that there would be black curtains on the desk, but
that he would have to wear leg restraints no matter what. R. 709:22-23.
On March 23, 2015, Mr. Rohwedder filed a motion for "unfettered restraints"
during the jury trial. R. 498. He stated that at the hearing standby counsel and the court
believed the "proper method of restraint" would be to compel Mr. Rohwedder to
"remain seated." R. 498. He told the court of an electronic taser vest which allowed
"unfettered movement" and which would "prevent prejudice" to the jury. R. 499. He
argued that requiring him to wear leg shackles would unfairly prejudice him. R. 499. He
asked the court to allow him unfettered movement during the trial. R. 499.
At a hearing held April 6, 2015, the court indicated that Mr. Rohwedder's
preference was to "do the taser vest" instead of leg shackles, but that "the sergeant ...
explained that the taser vest was used in addition to the shackles ... " R. 706:14. Mr.
Rohwedder complained that using the leg shackles would "prejudice my case" which
"[m]ake0 me look guilty." R. 706: 15. He reiterated that complaint toward the end of the
hearing, but the court would not allow him free movement. R. 706:67-68. A police officer
noted that with the restraints on Mr. Rohwedder would "not ... be able to walk naturally
enough ... to not have it be noticeable." R. 706:68. Mr. Rohwedder said he believed it
would look less prejudicial to at least move with restraints, "than to be stuck paralyzed in
... one spot for the entire trial." R. 706:69. The parties discussed having Mr. Rohwedder
walk around the courtroom with the leg braces and the vest, with a court officer noting
that "it's going to be very obvious." R. 706:70.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 30
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

On the first day of trial, the court security, Sgt. Russell, explained the taser vest to
Mr. Rohwedder:
Mr. Rohwedder, if you would be--so during jury selection process you will
not be allowed to move from that chair, which is standard. That normally
never happens anyway. Once procedure of the trial begins, we've indicated
on the floor here some little marks of clear tape. So you'll be allowed to
come up around the table into this area here. You will not be able to go
past this indication here, which is about the left edge of the defense table.
In the event there is a sidebar, you need to wait for explicit instruction from
the Judge to be able to approach. You can approach to about this area
without touching any of the wood paneling or any of the area up here. You
can just approach close enough to have, you know, any conversation with
the Judge, if necessary, and if she requests you approach. Otherwise I do
have an officer here who is in plain clothes. He has a remote that can
activate the vest that you're wearing.

And, then, you will not be able to cross this imaginary line right here, okay?
If you are to step across here, you'll be given one verbal command. If you
do not respond to that verbal command, I've given my officer authorization
to use the taser vest to incapacitate you, okay? Any questions or concerns
on that?
R. 705:7-8.
This procedure violated Mr. Rohwedder's right to a fair trial, since he looked
guilty to jurors from the outset.

The rule that a defendant be tried in the "garb of innocence" has generally
been extended to include a defendant's right to be tried without being
shackled, chained, bound, handcuffed, gagged, or otherwise physically
restrained. Numerous cases support the view that this right is an essential
component of a fair and impartial trial.

State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing numerous authorities).
According to this Court, "shackles should be used only as a last resort, in extreme cases."
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Id. at 474; Cf, State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2,

,r 21,

40 P.3d 611 (compelling a defendant to
Ci)

wear prison clothing during trial is "inherently prejudicial"). "Visibly shackling a
defendant is inherently prejudicial because _it suggests to the minds of jurors that he is
guilty, dangerous, or untrustworthy." State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 345,

,r

8, 57 P.3d

(i;J

1134 (citing Holbrook v. Fl:Jnn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 1345-46, 89 L. Ed.
2d 525 (1986)).
Not only is it possible that the sight of shackles and gags might have a
significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant, but the use of
this technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and
decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.
Moreover, one of the defendant's primary advantages of being present at
the trial, his ability to communicate with his counsel, is greatly reduced
when the defendant is in a condition of total physical restraint.

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1970); State v.
Gilbert, 121 N.H. 305, 310, 429 A.2d 323, 327 (1981) ("we recognize that the sight of the
accused in handcuffs alone might interfere with the presumption of the defendant's
innocence and that, therefore, courts should impose restraints or shackles on defendants
only in cases of evident necessity"). A trial cannot be fair when the defendant is visibly
shackled. A prisoner is "entitled to appear free from all bonds or shackles" to have a fair
trial. Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 105 (6th Cir. 1973). "[S]hackles should never be
permitted except to prevent the escape of the accused, to protect everyone in the
courtroom, and to maintain order during trial." Id.
In Kennedy, the court cited four reasons why defendants should not appear in
shackles in front of a jury:
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When the court allows a prisoner to be brought before a jury with his hands
chained in irons, and refuses, on his application, or that of his counsel, to
order their removal, the jury must necessarily conceive a prejudice against
the accused, as being in the opinion of the judge a dangerous man, and one
not to be tmsted, even under the surveillance of officers.

Id. at 105-06 (quoting State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591, 593 (1877)). Second,
any order or action of the Court which, without evident necessity, imposes
physical burdens, pains, and restraints upon a prisoner during the progress
of his trial, inevitably tends to confuse and embarrass his mental faculties,
and thereby materially to abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional
rights of defense and especially would such physical bonds and restraints in
like manner materially impair and prejudicially affect his statutory privilege
of becoming a competent witness and testifying in his own behalf.

Id. at 106 (quoting People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 168 (1871) (it deprives a defendant of
the "ability frilly to defend himself'). Third, "shackles may materially interfere with the
defendant's ability to consult orally or communicate in writing with defense counsel
during trial remains a valid reason for the general rule." Id. (quoting Allen, 397 U.S. at
344 ("one of the defendant's primary advantages of being present at the trial, his ability to
communicate with his counsel, is greatly reduced when the defendant is in a condition of
total physical restraint")). Fourth, "it detracts from the dignity and decorum of the judicial
process." Id.
The trial courl required Mr. Rohwedder to participate in his trial shackled and in
plain view of the jury. There were ways the trial court could have "minimize[d] the risk of
prejudice" to Mr. Rohwedder, most particularly by choosing to use the taser vest at their
disposal. People v. La.ng, 4Y Cal. 3d YY l, 1026, 782 P.2d 62'/, 650 (1989). Uufurluualdy,
the trial court did not give Mr. Rohwedder the option: he could sit at the table shackled
or he could get up and let the jury see his shackles. Mr. Rohwedder chose the latter, only
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because it seemed the least prejudicial of the options. By forcing him to sit in his seat, Mr.
Rohwedder felt that the jury would unnecessarily focus on those ~mitations of movement.
Either option was inherently prejudicial and because the court made no effort to mitigate
the inherent prejudice, Mr. Rohwedder could not make a voluntary choice. Houtz, 714
P.2d at 678.
For these reasons, the court prevented Mr. Rohwedder from receiving a fair trial.
He was not tried in an unprejudicial manner, which demands the reversal of his
conviction.

CONCLUSION
This court must reverse Mr. Rohwedder's conviction for three reasons. First, the
State violated his right to speedy trial. Second, his standby counsel failed to adequately
assist him in procuring witnesses for trial and in providing access to legal materials. Third,
the court allowed Mr. Rohwedder to be prejudiced by being tried in shackles.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24 day of May, 2016.

Isl Samuel P. Newton
SAMUEL P. NEWTON
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUMA
Constitutional Provisions

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
FIFTH AMENDMENT

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
SIXTH AMENDMENT

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defen(s)e.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, SECTION 1

~

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall· make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
proc.e.ss of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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UTAH CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7. [DUE PROCESS OF LAW.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
oflaw.
ARTICLE I, SECTION

10. [TRIAL BY JURY.]

In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital
cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases,
the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the
Legislature shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a
verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
ARTICLE I, SECTION

12. (RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf,
to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Tab B

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i
!

ADDENDUMB
Statutory Provisions

(i)
I
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Utah Code Ann.§ 77-1-7. Dismissal without trial -- Custody or discharge of
defendant.
(1)

(a)

Further prosecution for an offense is not barred if the court dismisses an

information or indictment based on the ground:

(i)

there was unreasonable delay;

(ii)

the court is without jurisdiction;

(iii)

the offense was not properly alleged in the information or indictment; or

(iv)

there was a defect in the impaneling or the proceedings relating to the grand jury.

(b)

The court may make orders regarding custody of the defendant pending the filing

of new charges as the interest of justice may require. OL11erwise, Lhe defendant shall be
discharged and bail exonerated.
(2)

An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant

to trial or upon the statute of limitations is a bar to any other prosecution for the offense
charged.
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Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 25. Dismissal without trial.
6i)

(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court may,
either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an information or
indictment dismissed.

(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when:

~

(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial;
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any bill of particulars
furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to be charged in the
pleading so filed;
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the impaneling or in
the proceedings relating to the grand jury;
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations.
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and entered in the
minutes.
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the ground~ that there was unr~asonable delay, or the
court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly alleged in the information or
indictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the proceedings relating to the
grand jury, further prosecution for the offense shall not be barred and the court may
make such orders with respect to the custody of the defendant pending the filing of new
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charges as the interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged
and bail exonerated.
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to trial

or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any other prosecution for the
offense charged.
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may dismiss the case
if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party. The irtjured party shall first
acknowledge the compromise before the court or in writing. The reasons for the order
shall be set forth therein and entered in the minutes. The order shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense; provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall
not be granted when the misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in
the performance of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to commit a felony.
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